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The environment in which a population evolves can have a crucial impact on
selection.Westudyevolutionarydynamicsinfinitepopulationsoffixedsizein
a changing environment. The population dynamics are driven by birth and
death events. The rates of these events may vary in time depending on the
state of the environment, which follows an independent Markov process.
Wedevelop ageneraltheoryfor thefixation probabilityof amutant ina popu-
lation of wild-types, and for mean unconditional and conditional fixation
times. We apply our theory to evolutionary games for which the payoff struc-
turevariesintime.Themutantcanexploittheenvironmentalnoise;adynamic
environment that switches between two states can lead to a probability of fix-
ation that is higher than in any of the individual environmental states. We
provide an intuitive interpretation of this surprising effect. We also investigate
stationary distributions when mutations are present in the dynamics. In this
regime, we find two approximations of the stationary measure. One works
well for rapid switching, the other for slowly fluctuating environments.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics describes the change of populations over time subject to
spontaneous mutation, selection and other random events [1,2]. Different phe-
notypes in the population can emerge spontaneously by mutation, i.e. through
errors during reproduction of wild-types. In many cases, wild-type and mutant
individuals are characterized by heritable differences in behavioural traits or
strategies [2]. Selection acts on different phenotypes and changes the population
composition. Changes in the state of the environment can alter these selective
pressures over time.
Time-varying environments are relevant in the evolution of bacterial
populations subject to environment modulations by a host [3,4], or varying anti-
biotic stress. An illustrative example is the evolution of normal (wild-type) cells
and resistant ‘persister’ cells (mutant). This was examined by Kussell et al. [5],
where periods of antibiosis were turned on and off. During times of antibiotic
stress, the growth rate of normal cells was reduced, but the resistant cells sustain
population levels. In addition, Acar et al. [6] provided further experimental
evidence supporting the deterministic model used in [5]. More complicated
studiesofdynamicsinswitchingenvironmentsrelyoncells‘sensing’theenviron-
ment [7] and on the history or information of the environment during a cell’s life
[8,9]. These examples illustrate that the assumption of an interaction structure
independent of time is not always realistic. At the same time, it is largely an
open question how complex interactions between phenotypes together with
spontaneous changes in the environment influence the evolutionary dynamics.
The interactions of phenotypes in a population can be formalized in an evol-
utionary game [10,11]. Such games can be used to describe conflict over food or
territory, cheating in resource allocation, as well as interactions between variants
of a gene [12–16]. In an evolutionary normal-form game, each individual can be
associated with one out of a finite set of strategies. A payoff matrix quantifies the
rewardreceivedbyagivenindividualwhenitinteractswithanotherindividual[11].
& 2014 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.The dynamics of populations interacting in such a game
are often described by deterministic replicator equations or
similar differential equations [10,17,18]. While deterministic
dynamics are useful to understand the action of selection
per se, more interesting phenomena arise when stochastic
effects are taken into account. A stochastic approach is appro-
priate—often even strictly required—to understand the
impact of fluctuations in finite populations [19,20]. Determi-
nistic approaches fail to capture effects such as fixation and
extinction, or the convergence to a stationary distribution in
systems with mutation [21–25].
There is an increasing body of literature on stochastic
evolutionary games. For example, analytical results for the
probabilities of a single mutant to reach fixation have been
obtained [26–29]. However, most of this existing work
focuses on games played in a fixed environment; the under-
lying payoff matrix itself remains unchanged in time. This
assumption may not be appropriate in cases where external
factors influence the environment.
External fluctuations in evolutionary games have been pre-
viously introduced by adding extrinsic noise to continuous
model parameters [30], or by letting strategy space itself vary
intime[31].Environmentalvariabilityhasalsobeenthesubject
of investigation in predator–prey models [32,33].
In this article, we explore different theoretical approaches
that allow calculations of fixation probabilities and mean
fixation times of a rare mutation, under fluctuating environ-
mental conditions. We use a generic birth–death framework,
as described in §2, and our results thus apply to a wide class
of population dynamics. In §3, the theory is developed for an
environment that can transit between an arbitrary number of
discrete states, and we expand on the two-environment scen-
arios in §4. To illustrate our theoretical results, we study the
fixation properties in an evolutionary game that stochastically
switches between acoexistence game and acoordinationgame
in §5. We determine environmental conditions under which
the success of a rare invading mutant is maximal. This is
seen to occur at a non-trivial combination of switching rates.
For the case in which mutations occur during the dynamics,
asdescribedin§6,weexplorehowthestationarydistributionof
thepopulationchangesinfluctuatingenvironments.Wederive
approximations for the stationary distribution, valid fora large
range of switching rates. We summarize our findings in §7 and
put them into context.
2. Mathematical model
We seek to model evolutionary dynamics in finite populations
of two species that are subject to environmental changes. The
changes in the environment are such that at any given point
intime,thesystemcanbeinoneofafinitesetofenvironmental
states. The state that the environment is in determines the
details of the birth and death dynamics. We focus on two
cases: first, in the absence of mutations in the dynamics, we
derive lawsto predict the probability and mean time of the fix-
ation of a mutant. Fixation describes the event in which
mutants take over the population as opposed to going extinct.
Fixation and extinction are the only twooutcomesof dynamics
of a rare mutant in afinite population [34]. In figure 1 we show
a basic sketch of this scenario in which the two monomorphic
states of the population are absorbing. Second, we study the
case when mutations occur in the dynamics. There are then
no absorbing states. Instead, the dynamics converges to a
stationary distribution.
2.1. Birth–death dynamics
We consider populations consisting of a fixed number of N
individuals. Each individual can be of one of two types, A or
B, which we refer to as ‘mutant’ and ‘wild-type’, respectively.
The population is well mixed; every individual can interact
with any other individual. The state of the population is fully
characterized by the number, i, of individuals of type A. The
remaining N 2 i individuals are of type B. We furthermore
assume that at any one time the environment can be in one
of V discrete states, labelled s [ L, where L is the space of
states of the environment (jLj ¼ V). Hence the state of the
entire system at any time is given by the pair (i,s).
The discrete-time birth–death dynamics of the population
for a given environment, s, is then specified by the transition
probabilities vþ
i,s and v 
i,s of a one-step process. Specifically, if
the system is in state (i,s) the population transitions to state
i þ 1 in the next time step with probability vþ
i,s. Similarly,
the state of the population in the next time step is i 2 1
i i+1 i–1 ... 1 ... N–1 N 0
f1,s
f1,s¢
i i+1 i–1 ... 1 ... N–1 N 0
environment s
ms→s¢ ms¢→s
environment s¢
Figure 1. A population undergoes a one-step birth–death process, such that given the population is in state i, in one time-step it may transit to i 2 1o ri þ 1, or
remain at i. The states i ¼ 0 and i ¼ N are absorbing in both environments (no arrows out of these states). The transition probabilities (birth/death rates) are
dependent on the state of the environment, indicated by solid versus dashed arrows in environments s and s0, respectively. The environment switches from state
s to s0 with probability ms!s’ in any one time-step. The quantity fi,s represents the probability of fixation, as discussed in §3. (Online version in colour.)
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2with a probability v 
i,s. These transitions are shown as black
arrows in figure 1. With probability 1   (vþ
i,s þ v 
i,s) the popu-
lation remains in state i. We always assume that v
+
i,s   0 and
vþ
i,s þ v 
i,s   1 for all (i,s).
With the exception of §6, we always assume that the states
i ¼ 0( a l l - B)a n di ¼ N (all-A)a r ea b s o r b i n g( vþ
0,s ¼ 0a n d
v 
N,s ¼ 0 for all s [ L). In the absence of further mutation
events, a type, once absent, can never be re-introduced. If
mutations are present in the dynamics, then the states i ¼ 0
and i ¼ N are no longer absorbing and the system converges to
aunique,non-trivialstationarystate.Weconsiderthiscasein§6.
2.2. Fluctuating environment
In our approach, the environment evolves from one state to
another independently of the state of the population. This sim-
plification still captures a wide array of natural scenarios. In
the discrete-time set-up, we take the dynamics of the environ-
ment as a simple Markov chain, described by the transition
matrix m ¼ (ms!s0) of size V   V. The entry ms!s0 represents
the probability that the environment changes to state s0 in
the next time-step, if it is currently in state s, as shown in
figure 1. The matrix m is a stochastic matrix,
P
s0 ms!s0 ¼ 1
for all s [ L.
A switch of the environment effectively modifies the
birth–death dynamics in the population. We do not specify
the exact type of interaction at this point, but keep the rates
v
+
i,s general.
3. Fixation probability and time for a general
birth–death process in a fluctuating
environment
3.1. Fixation probability
Let us first consider a discrete-time evolutionary process. If
the system is in state (i,s) at a given time, it may transition
to 3V possible states in any one time-step. These are given
by (i,s0), (i þ 1,s0) and (i 2 1,s0), where s0 [ L can be any
of the V states of the environment. If we write R(i,s)!( j,s’)
for the probability of a transition from (i,s)t o(j,s0), we have
R(i,s)!(iþ1,s0) ¼ ms!s0vþ
i,s ,( 3 :1a)
R(i,s)!(i 1,s0) ¼ ms!s0v 
i,s (3:1b)
and R(i,s)!(i,s0) ¼ ms!s0(1   vþ
i,s   v 
i,s): (3:1c)
No transitions from (i,s)t o(j,s0) can occur when ji 2 jj . 1.
In this set-up, the birth–death probabilities are determined
by the state of the environment at the beginning of the
discrete-time-step.
The fixation probability, fi,s, is the probability that the
system ends up in the absorbing state with N individuals of
type A, conditioned on initial state (i,s). The probability of
fixation of a single mutant, f1,s, is of particular interest
[21]. It is briefly illustrated in figure 1. In our scenario with
switching between V environmental states, following the
lines of the earlier studies [2,28,35], the following balance
equation for the fixation probabilities can be found:
fi,s ¼
X
s0 [ L
ms!s0
 
vþ
i,sfiþ1,s0 þ v 
i,sfi 1,s0
þ (1   vþ
i,s   v 
i,s)fi,s0
 
: (3:2)
This is to be solved along with the boundary conditions
f0,s ¼ 0 and fN,s ¼ 1 for all s [ L.
To obtain a formal solution, we introduce ci,s ¼ P
s0ms!s0fi,s0, or in matrix form c
i ¼ m   f
i. The vectors ci
and fi each have V components. The boundary conditions
f0,s ¼ 0 and fN,s ¼ 1 translate into c0,s ¼ 0 and cN,s ¼ 1
for all s [ L. With this notation, we have
fi,s ¼ vþ
i,s(ciþ1,s   ci,s)   v 
i,s(ci,s   ci 1,s) þ ci,s: (3:3)
Using f
i ¼ m 1  c
i, we obtain
ciþ1,s   ci,s ¼ gi,s(ci,s   ci 1,s) þ
1
vþ
i,s
(m 1  c
i )s   ci,s
hi
,
(3:4)
where gi,s ¼ v 
i,s=vþ
i,s. We stress that the calculation of fix-
ation probabilities and mean fixation times using this
formalism requires the matrix m to be invertible. We comment
on this further in the context of a specific example in §4.
To keep the notationcompact, we define the variableyi,s ¼
ci,s 2 ci 2 1,s. Using c0,s ¼ 0, we have ci,s ¼
Pi
j¼1 yj,s. With
this notation,wecanwriteequation(3.4)inthefollowingform:
yiþ1,s ¼ gi,syi,s þ
1
vþ
i,s
(m 1  I)  
X i
j¼1
yj
2
4
3
5
s
,( 3 :5)
whereI istheV   Videntitymatrix.Thisrelationexpressesthe
vector yi þ 1 in terms of the vectors y1, y2,...,yi. We can there-
fore express all vectors yi (i ¼ 2,...,N) in terms of y1. The
constraint
PN
i¼1 yi ¼ c
N ¼ (1,...,1 )
T then determines y1 self-
consistently. We note that the resulting set of equations is
linear in the set fy1,sg. Hence a solution can be obtained in a
closed form, in principle. In practice, one inverts the linear
system using one of the standard algebraic manipulation
packages. Once y1 has been found, the other components yi,
with i ¼ 2,...,N, can be computed via equation (3.5). One
then uses f
i ¼ m 1  
Pi
j¼1 yj to find the fixation probabilities
starting with i individuals of type A in environment s, ffi,sg.
We note here that algebraically inverting the linear system
(3.5) when N is large is difficult due to the very large number
of terms in the corresponding expressions. Thus, at present,
this theory is limited computationally to relatively small N.
In the case of a single environment, V ¼ 1, the matrix m is
simply the 1   1 identity matrix, and equation (3.5) simplifies
to the well-known result for discrete-time birth–death
processes [2,28,35].
3.2. Unconditional fixation time
We write ti,s for the expected number of time-steps taken to
reach any one of the two absorbing states, given that the
system is started in state (i,s). These fulfil the boundary con-
ditions t0,s ¼ tN,s ¼ 0. With these definitions we find the
following relation:
ti,s ¼
X
s0 [ L
ms!s0
 
vþ
i,stiþ1,s0 þ v 
i,sti 1,s0
þ (1   vþ
i,s   v 
i,s)ti,s0
 
þ 1: (3:6)
Introducing the variable ji,s ¼
P
s0 ms!s0ti,s0,w eh a v e
ti,s ¼ vþ
i,s(jiþ1,s   ji,s)   v 
i,s(ji,s   ji 1,s) þ ji,s þ 1, (3:7)
and with the notation ni,s ¼ ji,s 2 ji 2 1,s, we arrive at
niþ1,s ¼ gi,sni,s þ
1
vþ
i,s
(m 1  I)  
X i
j¼1
nj
2
4
3
5
s
 
1
vþ
i,s
: (3:8)
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3This relation allows one to express all vectors ni (i ¼ 2,...,N)
in terms of n1. The constraint
PN
i¼1 ni ¼ (0,...,0 )
T then deter-
mines n1, and the mean unconditional fixation times are
computed using ti ¼ m 1  
Pi
j¼1 nj.
3.3. Conditional fixation time
Wewrite tA
i,s for the mean fixation time conditioned on absorp-
tion in the all-A state, given that the system is initially in state
(i,s). To find this conditional fixation time, we proceed along
similar lines as before. Introducing the variable ui,s ¼ fi,stA
i,s,
which has boundary conditions u0,s ¼ uN,s ¼ 0, the following
balance equation can be found:
ui,s ¼
X
s0 [ L
ms!s0
 
vþ
i,suiþ1,s0 þ v 
i,sui 1,s0
þ (1   vþ
i,s   v 
i,s)ui,s0 þfi,s: (3:9)
Wenotethat equations(3.6)and(3.9)appeartobeverysimilar,
butthedifferenceismorethanjustaglobalpre-factor fi,s;ea ch
term in the expression has different indices i and s.
Introducing the variable zi,s ¼
P
s0ms!s0ui,s0,w eh a v e
ui,s ¼ vþ
i,s(ziþ1,s   zi,s)   v 
i,s(zi,s   zi 1,s) þ zi,s þ fi,s ,
(3:10)
and introducing hi,s ¼ zi,s 2 zi 2 1,s, we arrive at
hiþ1,s ¼ gi,shi,s þ
1
vþ
i,s
(m 1  I)  
X i
j¼1
h
j
2
4
3
5
s
 
1
vþ
i,s
fi,s: (3:11)
The set fui,sg can then be found using an approach similar
to the one described above. Results for the mean conditional
fixation time can then be obtained using tA
i,s ¼ ui,s=fi,s.
3.4. Continuous-time model
In any of the elementary time steps of the above discrete-time
model, both the state of the population (i) and the state of the
environment (s) can change. We next consider a continuous-
time set-up. There are two types of discrete events that may
occur at any time: (i) the state of the environment may change
or (ii) a birth–death event may occur. The rate (per unit time)
withwhichatransitionfromstatestostates0 occursisdenoted
by ms!s0. The occurrence of these events is independent of the
stateofthepopulation.Theratewithwhichabirth–deathevent
of the type i ! i þ 1o c c u r si sWþ
i,s, if the environment is in
state s. The rate with which i ! i 2 1o c c u r si sW 
i,s. We write
Pi,s(t) for the probability to find the system in state (i,s)a t
time t, and find the master equation
@tPi,s(t)¼Wþ
i 1,sPi 1,s(t) Wþ
i,sPi,s(t)þW 
iþ1,sPiþ1,s(t) W 
i,sPi,sðtÞ
þ
X
s0
[ms0!sPi,s0(t) ms!s0Pi,s(t)]: (3:12)
3.4.1. Fixation probability
We write Qj,s0;i,s(t) for the probability to find the system in
state ( j,s0) a period of time t after it has been started
in state (i,s). The corresponding backward master equation
[36,37] reads
@tQj,s0;i,s(t) ¼Wþ
i,s[Qj,s0;iþ1,s(t)   Qj,s0;i,s(t)]
þ W 
i,s[Qj,s0;i 1,s(t)   Qj,s0;i,s(t)]
þ
X
s00
ms!s00[Qj,s0;i,s00(t)   Qj,s0;i,s(t)]: (3:13)
We define wi,s(t) ¼
P
s0QN,s0;i,s(t) as the probability that the
system has reached fixation in the all-A state a period of
time t after the dynamics has been started in state (i,s).
This includes fixation before time t. By setting j ¼ N and
summing over s0 in equation (3.13), we obtain
@twi,s(t) ¼ Wþ
i,s[wiþ1,s(t)   wi,s(t)] þ W 
i,s[wi 1,s(t)   wi,s(t)]
þ
X
s00
ms!s00[wi,s00(t)   wi,s(t)]: (3:14)
The fixationprobabilities are found as fi,s ¼ limt!1wi,s(t), and
they can be obtained by setting the time derivative in equation
(3.14) to zero. Introducing yi,s ¼ fi,s 2 fi 2 1,s, one finds
yiþ1,s ¼ gi,syi,s þ
1
Wþ
i,s
X
s0
ms!s0
X i
j¼1
(yj,s   yj,s0)
2
4
3
5,( 3 :15)
with gi,s ¼ W 
i,s=Wþ
i,s and where we have used f0,s ¼ 0t o
write fi,s ¼
Pi
j¼1 yj,s. For the case of a single environment,
the second term on the right-hand side vanishes and one
recovers again the well-known results in single environments
[2,28,38]. Equation (3.15) has the same general structure as
equation (3.5). Keeping in mind that fN,s ¼ 1, the fixation
probabilities can hence be found by applying the approach
outlined in §3.1.
3.4.2. Fixation times
Calculating the mean fixation time using a diffusion approxi-
mation [34,36,37,39] is not appropriate for our model.
The environmental switching process has no continuum
limit. Instead we work with the backward master equa-
tion (3.13) and adapt the calculation outlined by Antal &
Scheuring [21].
We introduce qi,s(t) ¼
P
s0[Q0,s’;i,s(t) þ QN,s’;i,s(t)], the
probability that the system has reached fixation in either of
the two absorbing states a period of time t after being started
in (i,s). Again this includes fixation before t.W et h e nh a v e
ri,s(t) ¼ @tqi,s(t) for the probability density to reach fixation
exactly at time t. From the backward master equation (3.13),
we find
@tri,s(t) ¼ Wþ
i,s[riþ1,s(t)   ri,s(t)] þ W 
i,s[ri 1,s(t)   ri,s(t)]
þ
X
s0
ms!s0[ri,s0(t)   ri,s(t)]: (3:16)
The mean unconditional fixation time is then found via
ti,s ¼
Ð1
0 dttri,s(t), from which we find
 1 ¼Wþ
i,s[tiþ1,s   ti,s] þ W 
i,s[ti 1,s   ti,s]
þ
X
s0
ms!s0[ti,s0   ti,s]:
(3:17)
A similar iterative equation can be found for the mean fixation
timeconditionedon absorptionintheall-Astate.The only differ-
ence is the integral of rA
i,s(t) ¼ @t[
P
s0 QN,s0;i,s(t)] is given by the
fixation probability fi,s,a n dt h a ttA
i,s ¼ f 1
i,s
Ð 1
0 dttrA
i,s(t). The
mean conditional fixation times, tA
i,s, therefore fulfil the relation
 fi,s ¼ Wþ
i,s[fiþ1,stA
iþ1,s   fi,stA
i,s] þ W 
i,s[fi 1,stA
i 1,s   fi,stA
i,s]
þ
X
s0
ms!s0[fi,s0tA
i,s0   fi,stA
i,s]: (3:18)
Structurally, equations (3.17)and (3.18)are of the same form as
the corresponding equations for the discrete-time model, and
so they can be solved using an analogous procedure. In con-
tinuous time, however, the solution procedure no longer
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4relies on the invertibility of the matrix m of switching rates
between the states of the environment. This is because we
have split up the birth–death dynamics and the changes of
the environment into separate events that occur successively.
4. Switching between two environments
We now focus on the case of environments which can be
in one of two possible states, i.e. V ¼ 2. We label the
two states as s ¼ +1( L ¼ fþ1,21g). We focus on the
discrete-time scenario. The matrix m can then be written as
m ¼
1   pþ pþ
p  1   p 
  
,( 4 :1)
where the quantity ps (s [ {þ1,  1}) is the probability that
the state of the environment switches to 2s in a given
time-step if it is in state s at the beginning of this step. We
recall that our theoretical results require the inversion of m.
Excluding the case when D ¼ det m ¼ 1   pþ   p  vanishes,
this inversion can be carried out straightforwardly
m ¼
1
D
1   p   pþ
 p  1   pþ
  
: (4:2)
For the case D ¼ 0, we have verified that there is no anoma-
lous behaviour of simulation results.
4.1. Fixation probability and times
The general result of equation (3.5) now reducesto the recursion
yiþ1,s ¼ gi,syi,s þ
1
vþ
i,s
ps
D
X i
j¼1
(yj,s   yj, s): (4:3)
The fixation probability is obtained from the set fni,sg via
fi,s ¼
X i
j¼1
1   p s
D
yj,s  
ps
D
yj, s
  
: (4:4)
Similarly, equations (3.8) and (3.11) reduce to
niþ1,s ¼ gi,sni,s þ
1
vþ
i,s
ps
D
X i
j¼1
(nj,s   nj, s)  
1
vþ
i,s
(4:5)
and
hiþ1,s ¼ gi,shi,s þ
1
vþ
i,s
ps
D
X i
j¼1
(hj,s   hj, s)  
1
vþ
i,s
fi,s ,( 4 :6)
respectively. The mean unconditional and conditional fixation
times are then found, respectively, as
ti,s ¼
X i
j¼1
1   p s
D
nj,s  
ps
D
nj, s
  
(4:7)
and
tA
i,s ¼
1
fi,s
X i
j¼1
1   p s
D
hj,s  
ps
D
hj, s
  
: (4:8)
4.2. Effective description for fast switching
The environmental change is fast if the environmental states
are short-lived, i.e. much shorter than the mean fixation time
in either environment. Then we expect the population
dynamics to be controlled by a set of effective transition prob-
abilities, i.e. weighted averages of the original transition
probabilities in the different environmental states. The
weights are given by the fraction of time spent in each
environmental state. As the dynamics of s follows a simple
telegraph process [36], the asymptotic fraction of time spent
in the state s is p2s/(psþp2s) for s [ { 1, þ1}. Using this,
the effective transition probabilities are given by
v
+
i,eff ¼
p 
pþ þ p 
v
+
i,þ þ
pþ
pþ þ p 
v
+
i, : (4:9)
We note that ps is the probability that in a given time-step
the environment switches from state s to 2s. Hence the
time spent in state s decreases with increasing ps if p2s is
held fixed.
We anticipate that expression (4.9) can formally be
derived by introducing a relative scaling parameter between
the switching probabilities and the birth–death probabilities,
and then by taking a suitable limit in which the timescales of
both processes are widely separated. We do not explore this
route further here.
In this approximation, the dynamics of the population are
mapped to a simple birth–death process on the set
i [ {0, 1, ..., N} with absorbing states i ¼ 0 and i ¼ N.F o r
such processes, explicit expressions for the fixation probabil-
ities and mean fixation times are known [2,28,35]. In the fast-
switching limit, we propose the following approximation for
the fixation probability:
fi,eff ¼
1 þ
Pi 1
k¼1
Qk
j¼1 gj,eff
1 þ
PN 1
k¼1
Qk
j¼1 gj,eff
: (4:10)
We write here gi,eff ¼ v 
i,eff=vþ
i,eff. The corresponding approxi-
mations for the mean unconditional and conditional fixation
times of a single mutant, respectively, are
t1,eff ¼ f
eff
1
X N 1
k¼1
X k
l¼1
1
vþ
l,eff
Y k
m¼lþ1
gm,eff (4:11)
and
tA
1,eff ¼
X N 1
k¼1
X k
l¼1
fl,eff
vþ
l,eff
Y k
m¼lþ1
gm,eff: (4:12)
These expressions exactly describe the fixation properties
of a birth–death system with the effective transition probabil-
ities; the nature of our approximation is to assume that the
birth–death process in quickly changing environments can
be described by the effective transition probabilities in
equation (4.9).
Finally, we note that this theory is independent of the
invertibility of the switching matrix m.
5. Fixation in fluctuating two-player
two-strategy games
5.1. Evolutionary games
As a direct application of the general theory we have devel-
oped, we now consider evolutionary game dynamics in
well-mixed, finite populations. Any of the N individuals
can be of one of two types, A or B. We limit the discussion
to two-player games, but the extension to multi-player
games (e.g. [25,40,41]) is straightforward.
At any point in time the environment is in one of two dis-
crete states (s [ {þ1,  1}). This state fluctuates in time as
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5specified above. The interaction between individuals is
characterized by the payoff matrix
AB
Aa s bs
Bc s ds:
(5:1)
The subscript s indicates the dependence on the environ-
ment. The matrix focuses on the column player: a type-A
individual encountering another of its kind receives as, and
it receives bs when interacting with a type-B individual. In
turn, an individual of type B interacting with an individual
of type A obtains cs, and ds is the payoff for each individual
if they are both of type B.
If the environment is in state s, and if there are i
individuals of type A in the population and N 2 i indivi-
duals of type B, the expected payoffs for each type of
player are
ps
A(i) ¼
i   1
N   1
as þ
N   i
N   1
bs (5:2a)
and ps
B(i) ¼
i
N   1
cs þ
N   i   1
N   1
ds: (5:2b)
The reproductive fitness of any individual is a function of the
individual’s payoff in the evolutionary game. We use an
exponential mapping [42,43]
fs
A(i) ¼ ebps
A(i) ð5:3aÞ
and fs
B(i) ¼ ebps
B(i): ð5:3bÞ
This is a common natural choice in which fitness is never
negative and monotonically increasing with payoff.
Any other functional form of the payoff-to-fitness mapping
with these two properties would be equally appropriate.
The constant parameter b . 0 is the so-called intensity of
selection. Based on this definition of fitness, we model the
evolutionary dynamics by the update rules of the Moran pro-
cess [34,44], which has been widely used in evolutionary
game theory [2,28,45]. The Moran process represents a
simple birth–death process in which the population size
remains constant, and by construction it has absorbing
states at i ¼ 0 and i ¼ N. In a discrete-time setting, the
frequency-dependent Moran process is specified by the
transition probabilities [46]
vþ
i,s ¼
i(N   i)
N2
fs
A(i)
f
s
(i)
and v 
i,s ¼
i(N   i)
N2
fs
B(i)
f
s
(i)
,( 5 :4)
where f
s
(i) ¼ [ifs
A(i) þ (N   i)fs
B(i)]=N is the average fitness in
the population. We note that the framework of the previous
section can be applied to microscopic evolutionary dynamics
other than the Moran process. This includes, for example,
pairwise comparison processes [47,48] or cases with constant
selection in any one environment.
5.2. Switching between coexistence and coordination
games
Rare mutations can introduce a previously absent strategy
into the population. Typically, there is only one individual
of this novel type initially. We say that B is the resident
type, and that A is the invading mutant type. All results in
this section are based on the initial condition i ¼ 1. We
chose as ¼ ds ¼ 1 for the payoff matrix. The type of game is
then determined by the off-diagonal terms. We chose bs ¼
1 þ sb and cs ¼ 1 þ sc, where b and c are real-valued par-
ameters. Thus, we have the payoff matrix
AB
A 11 þ sb
B 1 þ sc 1:
(5:5)
Our parametrization does not span the entire space of all
2   2 games, but it covers some of the most common
types (see below).
There exist three general types of two-player two-strategy
evolutionary games. First, for the coexistence game bs . 1
and cs . 1, selection drives the population away from the
absorbing boundaries. Second, for bs , 1 and cs , 1, the
population dynamics exhibits bi-stability. This is also
known as a coordination game; selection drives the popu-
lation towards the monomorphic states. In both cases, there
exists an internal point in frequency space for which the
direction of selection changes its sign, i.e. at which the gradi-
ent of selection is zero. This point can be calculated by
solving vþ
i,s ¼ v 
i,s (or equivalently fs
A(i) ¼ fs
B(i)) for i, and
broadly speaking it is determined by the relative magnitudes
of b and c. Third, for bs . 1, cs . 1 (or bs , 1, cs , 1) type A
(or type B) always has the higher fitness irrespective of the
composition of the population. This type is then always
favoured by selection, which never changes direction.
For the remainder of this article, we focus on switching
between coexistence and coordination games. More precisely,
we choose b . 0 and c . 0 in (5.5). The coexistence game
corresponds to s ¼ þ1 and the coordination game to s ¼21.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Sample trajectory of the dynamics
In figure 2a, we show a sample trajectory of a simulation in
which a single mutant reaches fixation. The gradient of selec-
tion, vþ
i,s   v 
i,s, for the two games is shown in figure 2b and c.
During periods when the environment is in the coexistence
state (light background) the population fluctuates about the
selection-balance point (dashed line), and during periods
when the environment is in the coordination state (shaded
background) the population is driven away from the selection-
balance point. In the final period in the coordination state the
mutant is driven to fixation.
5.3.2. Fixation probability and conditional fixation time
Infigure3,weshow theeffectofswitching theenvironmenton
the fixation dynamics. We choose c . b . 0. By equating the
reaction probabilities (i.e. setting vþ
i,s ¼ v 
i,s), or equivalently
equating the expected payoffs in equation (5.2), and looking
at leading order terms in N, the gradient of selection is seen
to change sign at i*/N   b/(b þ c) , 1/2. This point is closer
to the extinction state of the mutant (i ¼ 0) than to the fixation
state (i ¼ N). We next describe the key observations we make
from these results, before we turn to their interpretation.
Fixation probability (figure 3a). The fixation probability in
this example depends non-trivially on the rates with which
the environment switches states; we find an optimal combi-
nation of switching rates, pþ ≃ p2, for which fixation of a
single mutant is most probable (figure 3a). The fixation prob-
ability is dependent on the initial state of the environment for
ps & 0:1.
Fixation time (figure 3b). Mean conditional fixation times
show very little dependence on the initial state of the
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6environment. The fixation time is small for pþ . p2 when the
environment is found mostly in the coordination game, and
large when the environment is mostly in the coexistence state.
Validity of the theoretical approach. As shown in both panels
of figure 3, the theoretical predictions of equations (4.4) and
(4.8), indicated by solid lines, are in convincing agreement
with simulation data. Theoretical results from the model
with effective transition rates (§4.2) reproduce the simulation
data qualitatively. Quantitative agreement is obtained in the
limit of large switching rates, but unsurprisingly, there are
systematic deviations when switching is slow.
5.3.3. Interpretation
We now proceed and give an intuitive explanation for the
observed effects.
Meanconditionalfixationtimeisreducedasmoretimeisspentin
coordination environment.Thebehaviourof the fixationtime can
intuitively be understood from the deterministic gradient of
selection of the two games (figure 2b,c). If fixation happens, it
will generally be quicker in the coordination game than in
the coexistence game [21,49]. This is due to the adverse selec-
tion bias in the coordination game at low mutant numbers
(figure 2c). The more time the system spends in this region of
adverse selection the less probable it is for the mutant to
reach fixation. Thus, if fixation happens in a coordination
game then it happens fast. In the coexistence game, on the
other hand, the direction of selection is towards the balance
point, as shown in figure 2b. The system can ‘afford’ to spend
significant time in the region of small mutant numbers and
still reach fixation eventually even after repeated excursions
throughout frequency space. There is thus no need for fixation
to occur quickly, and conditional fixation times can be long.
These observations make it plausible that the mean con-
ditional fixation time will generally decrease when less time
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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Figure 2. (a) A sample trajectory (time series) of the fraction of individuals of type A. White background corresponds to the environment being in the s ¼þ1
coexistence state, while the shaded background corresponds to the s ¼21 coordination state. Dashed line is the location of the point at which selection balances,
which is the same in both states of the environment. (b) Gradient of selection in the s ¼þ1 coexistence state (vþ
i,þ v 
i,þ). Solid circle shows location of the
point of selection balance, and arrows indicate the direction and magnitude of flow towards this point. (c) Gradient of selection in the s ¼21 coordination state
(vþ
i,    v 
i, ). Empty circle shows location of the point of selection balance, and arrows indicate the direction and magnitude of flow away from this point. For the
realization in panel (a) and the selection bias shown in (b) and (c), the payoff matrix elements are as ¼ ds ¼ 1, bs ¼ 1 þ 0.5s and cs ¼ 1 þ 0.9s, the
system size is N ¼ 100, the selection intensity is b ¼ 1, and the switching probabilities are pþ ¼ 10
23 and p2 ¼ 10
24. (Online version in colour.)
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increasing time spent in coexistence state increasing time spent in coexistence state
Figure 3. (a) Fixation probability of a single mutant as a function of switching probabilities. The main panel shows simulation results (symbols; crosses correspond
to s(0) ¼ þ1 and circles to s(0) ¼21) for fixed p2 ¼ 0.01, along with the exact theoretical results (solid lines) from equation (4.4), and the effective theor-
etical result (dashed line) of equation (4.10). Inset panels show fixation probabilities from equation (4.4) over all combinations of pþ and p2. Left inset panel: initial
condition s(0) ¼ þ1. Right inset panel: s(0) ¼21. The horizontal lines correspond to the data shown in the main panel. (b) Mean conditional fixation time (in
generations) of a single mutant as a function of switching probabilities. The main panel shows simulation results, as described above, for fixed p2 ¼ 0.01, along
with the exact theoretical results (solid lines) of equation (4.8), and the effective theoretical result (dashed line) of equation (4.12). Inset panels show mean
conditional fixation times from equation (4.8) over all combinations of pþ and p2. Left inset panel: initial condition s(0) ¼ þ1. Right inset panel: initial condi-
tion s(0) ¼21. The horizontal lines correspond to the data shown in the main panel. The payoff matrix elements are as ¼ ds ¼ 1, bs ¼ 1 þ 0.5s and
cs ¼ 1 þ 0.9s, the system size is N ¼ 50, and the selection intensity is b ¼ 0.5. (Online version in colour.)
r
s
i
f
.
r
o
y
a
l
s
o
c
i
e
t
y
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
.
o
r
g
J
.
R
.
S
o
c
.
I
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
e
1
1
:
2
0
1
4
0
6
6
3
7is spent in the coexistence game, which is exactly what we find
in figure 3b. We have tested other choices of the parameters b
and c for which the two games are a coexistence game and a
coordination game, and we find that the behaviour of the
mean conditional fixation times is robust under these changes.
Mean conditional fixation time is largely independent of the
initial state of the environment. Systems started in the coordi-
nation environment will tend to reach extinction relatively
quickly duetoinitialadverseselection, unlesstheenvironment
switches to the coexistence state early on. Thus, the sample of
runs that reach fixation started from the coordination-game
environment will be dominated by runs in which the environ-
ment switches soon after the start of the run. Then we expect
that the value of the mean conditional fixation time is close
to the one obtained when starting in the coexistence game.
Dependence of fixation probability on the initial state of the
environment. The data in figure 3a show that initiating
the dynamics in the coexistence game favours fixation of the
mutants for pþ & 0:1 (when p2 ¼ 0.01 is fixed), however,
above this threshold the initial state of the environment has
relatively little effect. The reason for this is as follows. When
starting in the coordination game, selection pushes the
mutant towards extinction. Hence, fixation is more probable
if the initial state is the coexistence fitness landscape. Above
pþ ≃ 0.1, the switching process of the environment is too fast
for the initial condition to have any significant effect on the
population dynamics. It is this regime in which we expect
the effective description (§4.2) to approximate the system
well. This is indeed confirmed in figure 3, the theoretical pre-
diction of the effective theory, equation (4.10), agrees well
with our simulation results in this fast-switching region.
Behaviour of fixation probability depends on location of the
selection-balance point. If the environment is fixed to the
coexistence-game state, fixation is more probable the closer
the point of selection balance is to the fixated state (figure 4a).
The location of this balance point is approximated by i*/N ¼
1/(1 þ c/b), and so the fixation probability increases as c/b is
decreased. In a fixed coordination-game environment, the
reverse is the case. The range of adverse selection is to the left
of the balance point, and so fixation is less probable the closer
the point of selection balance is to the fixated state.
For b   c, i.e. a selection bias point close to i ¼ 0, we
therefore expect that the fixation probability will increase
the more time that is spent in the coordination-game environ-
ment, i.e. f1,s is an increasing function of the probability pþ
with which the system leaves the s ¼ þ1 state (coexistence
game). This is indeed what we find in simulations (data not
shown). For b   c, i.e. i* close to i ¼ N, the reverse is the
case. Fixation is more probable in the coexistence game
(s ¼ þ1), and the fixation probability is hence a decreasing
function of pþ at fixed p2. Although we do not show the
data here, this is again confirmed in simulations.
For b   c the situation is less clear. The fixation probability
will be comparable in both games if the environment is frozen.
Two effects here conspire to produce a non-trivial outcome:
(i) Consider the case in which the system is mostly in the
coordination-game state, i.e. pþ   p . It is plausible
that an occasional switch to a coexistence game will
make fixation more probable than in a constant coordi-
nation game. This is because the coexistence-game
environment pushes the system away from extinction
at low mutant numbers. In the regime of pþ   p ,
we thus expect the fixation probability to increase as
pþ is lowered. In other words, f1,s(pþ) is a decreasing
function at large pþ.
(ii) Similarly, if the system is mostly in the coexistence-game
environment (pþ   p ), short periods of time in the
coordination game can make fixation more probable.
This is because selection at large mutant numbers is
directed towards fixation in the coordination game. At
pþ   p ,w ee xpectf1,s tobeanincreasingfunctionofpþ.
These two effects taken together generate a maximum of the
fixation probability at intermediate values of pþ   p2, which
is exactly what we find in figure 3a. We would like to stress
that the effect (i) is only present provided the selection-
balance point is not too close to the extinct state. The
phenomenon discussed under (ii) is present only if the
selection-balance point is not too close to the fixated state.
If the balance point is located too close to either boundary,
the corresponding effect will be suppressed and the remain-
ing effect dominates. One then finds monotonically
increasing or decreasing dependences f1,s(pþ).
To confirm our picture, we varied the payoff parameters b
and c, and find the value of pþ that maximizes fixation
probability for a given p2 ¼ 0.01, as a function of b and c in
figure 4b. The point of selection balance is approximately
1/(1 þ c/b)(uptosystem-sizecorrections).Thepresenceofdiag-
onal structures in figure 4b shows that the behaviour of the
fixation probability is dependent on the location of the
selection-balance point. If this point is close to the fixation state
i ¼ N (b   c, bottom-right in figure 4b), then the fixation prob-
ability is maximal for vanishing pþ. If this point is close to the
extinction state (b   c,t o p - l e f ti nf i g u r e4 b), then the fixation
probability is maximal for large pþ. For intermediate locations
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b
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Figure 4. (a) Illustration of selection bias in the two environments for different locations of the balance point; (b) value of pþ at which f1,s is maximal given
p2 ¼ 0.01 as a function of b and c. Remaining parameters are b ¼ 0.5 and N ¼ 50. (Online version in colour.)
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8of the selection-balance point (b   c) fixation is maximized at a
non-trivial combination of environment states.
The features observed in figure 3, i.e. the peak in the fix-
ation probability and shape of the mean conditional fixation
time as a function of pþ, are found to be robust when the
system size is increased. Fixation probabilities generally
decreasewithsystemsizebuttheobservedpeakbecomesshar-
per.Themeanconditionalfixationtimesinafrozencoexistence
environment scale exponentially with N, whereas they scale as
the logarithm of N in the coordination environment [50]. We
observethesescalingsinoursystem,withthemeanconditional
fixation time increasing exponentially with N for small pþ,a n d
increasing sub-linearly with N for large pþ.
6. Mutation-selection equilibria under
fluctuating environments
6.1. Mutations and stationary distributions
We now consider systems with mutations occurring during
the dynamics. This removes the possibility of fixation and
extinction. The combination of mutation, selection and
noise can lead to non-trivial stationary states. We intro-
duce mutation by modifying the discrete-time transition
probabilities of equation (5.4) and now use
^ vþ
i,s ¼ (1   u)
i(N   i)
N2
fs
A(i)
f
s
(i)
þ u
(N   i)
2
N2 ð6:1aÞ
and ^ v 
i,s ¼ (1   u)
i(N   i)
N2
fs
B(i)
f
s
(i)
þ u
i2
N2 , ð6:1bÞ
where u   1 is the mutation rate. The transition probabilities
^ vþ
0,s ¼ ^ v 
N,s ¼ u are now non-zero, and so the states i ¼ 0 and
i ¼ N are no longer absorbing.
The stationary probability ri,s of finding the system in
state (i,s)( i ¼ 0,1,...,N, s [ L) is obtained as the solution
of the balance equation
ri,s ¼
X
s0 [ L
ms0!s
 
^ vþ
i 1,s0 ri 1,s0 þ ^ v 
iþ1,s0 riþ1,s0
þ(1   ^ vþ
i,s0   ^ vþ
i,s0 )ri,s0 : (6:2)
This equation is of the form ri,s ¼
P
s0
P
j ^ R(j,s0)!(i,s) rj,s0, and it
is solved by finding the eigenvector corresponding to the
eigenvalue l ¼ 1 of the linear operator ^ R. In principle, this
can be done analytically, but we use standard numerical
packages to find the eigenvector. The stationary distribution
for the state of the population is found by summing over all
states of the environment, ri ¼
P
sri,s. This solution is exact.
If the environment states are long-lived, the population
will relax to the stationary state of the current environment
before the next switching event. With this, one might
expect that the overall stationary distribution is the weighted
average of the stationary distributions one would obtain in
the respective stationary environments. The stationary distri-
bution in a single fixed environment, s, can be found
explicitly as
r
(1)
i,s ¼ Gi,sr
(1)
0,s , Gi,s ¼
Y i
j¼1
^ vþ
j 1,s
^ v 
j,s
,
r
(1)
0,s ¼ 1 þ
X N
i¼1
Gi,s
 !  1
:
(6:3)
This can be derived for example from equation (6.2) assuming
that the transition matrix of the environment is diago-
nal, ms!s’ ¼ dss’, where dss’ is the Kronecker delta. The
average stationary distribution over many slow-switching
environments can then be written as
  ri ¼
X
s0 [ L
rs0r
(1)
i,s0,( 6 :4)
where rs is the probability that the environment is in state s.
Alternatively, if the switching probabilities per time-step
are large one might expect the stationary distribution to be
approximated by the distribution found in a system controlled
by the effective transition rates, ^ v
+
i,eff. These are obtained as
described in §4.2, with suitable modifications to account for
mutation. The resulting stationary distribution is found as
ri,eff ¼ Gi,effr0,eff, Gi,eff ¼
Y i
j¼1
^ vþ
j 1,eff
^ v 
j,eff
,
r0,eff ¼ 1 þ
X N
i¼1
Gi,eff
 !  1
:
(6:5)
The distributions   ri and ri,eff are both approximations. To
evaluate the validity of the assumptions leading to these
approximations, we compute the distance
d(t) ¼
1
2
X N
i¼0
jri   Psim
i (t)j,( 6 :6)
and similarly for ri,eff, where Psim
i (t) is distribution of the
population at time t obtained from simulations. To confirm
our analytical approach, we also compute the distance of
simulation data from the exact solution for ri. We allow the
system to run for a fixed time T, and we then use the time-
averaged distance,   d ¼ (2=T)
Ð T
T=2 d(t)d t to evaluate the accu-
racy of the approximations. We ignore the first half of the
time series to remove remnants of the initial condition. We
note that the time T, measured in generations, is equivalent
to NT simulation time-steps and is chosen to be long
enough such that the system relaxes to the stationary state
before measurements start at time T/2.
6.2. Results
We present results for the two-world scenario, where the
environment switches between a coexistence game and a
coordination game as described above. The stationary dis-
tribution of the environmental state is given by rs ¼þ1 ¼
p2/(pþþp2) and rs ¼21 ¼ pþ/(pþþp2).
The stationary distributions of the population for the
fixed environments (calculated using equation (6.3)) are
shown in figure 5a. In a constant coexistence game (s ¼þ1),
the stationary distribution is peaked about the point at
which the gradient of selection changes sign, and in a fixed
coordination-game environment (s ¼21) we find a distri-
bution that is strongly peaked near the i ¼ N state. The
asymmetry is due to the imbalanced payoff matrix used,
such that the basin of attraction for the i ≃ N state is much
larger than for the i ≃ 0 state. For the parameters chosen in
figure 5, the selection-balance point is at i*   18.
For equal switching rates, pþ ¼ p2, the averaged
stationary distribution   ri lies exactly in between the two
single-environment distributions. The effective distribution
is approximately uniform in the centre of the domain, with
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9a lower probability of being found close to the domain
boundaries. This reflects the fact that for equal switching
probabilities the effective game is close to neutral, but
frequent mutations push the population to the interior.
The exact solution (equation (6.2)) matches the features of
the single-environment distributions, with a peak at i ≃ N
and at the coexistence point i*. Interestingly, this solution
also predicts a peak at the i ≃ 0 state, a feature that is
not seen in the single-environment distributions, or in the
effective distribution.
As seen in the main panel of figure 5b, the exact solution
is confirmed by simulations across many orders of magnitude
of switching probabilities. Any deviations can be attributed
to incomplete equilibration of the measure used in equation
(6.6). For large switching probabilities, the effective stationary
distribution, ri,eff, matches the simulations. As expected the
effective theory becomes inaccurate for slow switching,
roughly below ps ≃ 10
22, in our example. The weighted aver-
age stationary distribution,   ri, shows the opposite behaviour.
It is in reasonable agreement with simulations for slow
switching, but shows systematic deviations when the switch-
ing process is too fast for the population to react adiabatically.
This picture is further corroborated by the data shown in
the inset panels of figure 5b. The weighted average and the
effective distributions accurately predict the stationary distri-
bution obtained from simulations when the two switching
rates are very disparate, i.e. pþ   p  or vice versa (top-left
and bottom-right corners of the two insets). In these regions,
the environment spends most of its time in one state, so that
the model effectively reduces to the single-environment case.
Simulation data, the exact solution, and both approximations
then all collapse to the same result, the stationary distribution
obtained in a single fixed environment.
The approach based on effective transition rates (right
inset of figure 5b) is found to be accurate over a large range
of switching probabilities away from the slow-switching
scenario. Conversely, the weighted average distribution (left
inset of figure 5b) becomes increasingly accurate if the
dynamics of the environment is slow (ps ! 0).
7. Summary and conclusion
The dynamics of a population evolving under changing
environmental conditions is an important concept in the
study of bacterial populations. Previous work has focused
on deterministic analyses [5], or on an environment following
a continuous stochastic process [30]. Here, we have taken a
different route and assumed that the environment switches
between discrete states. We have developed the mathematical
formalism to describe fixation properties in a general birth–
death process in an environment fluctuating between an
arbitrary number of states. The main results of this investi-
gation are self-consistent expressions for the fixation
probability of a mutant in a fixed-size population, as well
as for the mean unconditional and conditional fixation
times. For short-lived environments, we put forward an
approximation based on effective transition probabilities.
As a specific application we discuss the fixation proper-
ties in the context of an evolutionary game in a two-world
scenario. The two states of the environment then correspond
to two different payoff matrices of the underlying games.
Simulations confirm our exact solution over a wide range of
switching probabilities. The approximation based on effective
transition probabilities is seen to reproduce simulation data
in the limit of fast switching.
Focusing on the case of switching between a coexistence
game and a coordination game we find unexpected non-
trivial behaviour of the fixation probability of a single
mutant. We observe in our analytical results and in simu-
lations that fixation can be more probable in a scenario in
which the fitness landscape switches between the two
games than in either of the two constant environments. We
provide an intuitive explanation for this effect, and we have
investigated in detail the circumstances under which this
phenomenon can occur.
Adding mutations to the dynamics removes the possibi-
lity of fixation, but introduces non-trivial stationary states.
We develop a method for the calculation of this distribu-
tion, along with approximations for long- and short-lived
exact, ri
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Figure 5. (a) The stationary distributions in the single-environment coexistence game r(1)
i,þ (dotted line) and coordination game r(1)
i,  (dashed lines) calculated from
equation (6.3), along with the exact solution ri (equation (6.2), evaluated numerically) and the ‘average’ ri (equation (6.4)) and ‘effective’ ri,eff (equation (6.5))
approximate stationary solutions (solid lines). These distributions are for switching probabilities pþ ¼ p2 ¼ 10
23.( b) The time-averaged distance (equation (6.6))
between distributions obtained from an ensemble of 5   10
5 simulations, Qi(t), and the analytic stationary distributions for symmetric switching, pþ ¼ p2.
Simulations run for T ¼ 2   10
3 generations. Inset plots show the time-averaged distances over all switching-parameter space. Left inset panel shows the distance
to the ‘averaged’ stationary solution (equation (6.4)), and right inset panel shows the distance to the ‘effective’ stationary solution (equation (6.5)). The payoff matrix
elements are as ¼ ds ¼ 1, bs ¼ 1 þ 0.5s and cs ¼ 1 þ 0.9s, the system size is N ¼ 50, the selection intensity is b ¼ 0.5, and the mutation probability is
u ¼ 0.02. (Online version in colour.)
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10environmental states, respectively. These approximations are
shown to agreewell with simulations in their respective limits.
The general theory developed here now allows further
investigation of evolutionary dynamics in time-varying
environments. It provides a first mathematical characteriz-
ation of the effects one may expect in such systems. The
closed form self-consistent solutions will help to speed up
future studies, and they may remove the need for extensive
computer simulations.
While our work is mainly mathematical, we think that
our theory can be used to interpret existing experimental
studies such as those studied by Acar et al. [6]. For some bio-
logical systems, it may be more appropriate to use constant
selection in each environment, as opposed to frequency-
dependent selection. Our example of switching between
coexistence and coordination games was chosen to illustrate
the theory. We have also seen such cases lead to unexpected
effects. We note that both types of game have been observed
in systems of experimental evolution [14,51,52]. We hope the
formalism we have developed will be useful to analyse
models closer to other biological applications, and potentially
to guide future experiments on evolutionary systems in time-
dependent environments.
On a more general level constructing a mathematical
theory of evolutionary dynamics is very much work in pro-
gress. An integral part of the evolution of microbes and
higher organisms alike is frequency-dependent selection. At
the same time, external factors determining the detailed
mechanics of selection may vary in time. In this work, we
have combined frequency-dependent selection, fluctuating
environments and stochastic dynamics in finite populations
into one model, and we have provided the analytical tools
for its analysis. This, we hope, is a contribution towards a
more complete understanding of evolutionary processes.
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